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Buford Ave., St. Paul, MN 55108, USA.FOOD PROCESSORS' LOBBYING ACTIVITY AND FARM POLICY
Executive Summary
This study tests the hypothesis that lobbying by food firms does not contravene United
States farm policy, particularly commodity programs.  The research is important in the analysis and
understanding of the difficulties of designing and reforming agricultural policies.  If farm programs
significantly benefit downstream food firms, there is effectively no countervailing power to the farm
lobby because (1) farm input supply and marketing firms have been shown to benefit from existing
farm policies - and have therefore no incentive to lobby against the policies - and (2) consumers
and taxpayers, two important stakeholders in agricultural policies, are known to be quite inefficient
in lobbying due to their "large-group" characteristics. 
Information on food firms' total lobbying expenditure is combined with the behavioral
assumption of profit maximization to generate an econometric model of lobbying expenditure
allocation by food firms.  The model is used to carry out the test.
The results indicate that food firms do not lobby to influence agricultural commodity
markets.  The ultimate implication is that the food processing sector of the agribusiness sector has
no serious incentive to act as a countervailing power to the farm lobby in the forming or reforming
of agricultural policy.  Thus, attempts to reform agricultural policies will be resisted by a coalition
of agribusiness and the farm sector.
A limitation of the study is that the hypothesis test does not separate agricultural
commodities from other inputs to food firms.  However, because agricultural commodities
constitute almost half of the food firms' overall input costs, the test provides evidence about
lobbying for agricultural policies.Table of Contents.
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Introduction
The structure of current agricultural commodity programs have been shown to benefit input
suppliers, marketing firms and farm commodity groups (Gardner; Alston, Carter, and Wohlgenant;
Knudson, Penn and Boehm).  It is an accepted proposition that these groups, in turn, influence the
design and implementation of agricultural policy.  Much less is known about the effect of lobbying
by food processing and manufacturing firms on the structure of agricultural policy.
This study looks at the impacts of lobbying by the food manufacturing firms on farm policy.
It is important in the analysis and understanding of the difficulties of designing and reforming
agricultural policies.  If farm programs significantly benefit downstream food firms, there is
effectively no countervailing power to the farm lobby because (1) farm input supply and marketing
firms benefit from existing farm policies - and have, therefore, no incentive to lobby against the
policies - and (2) consumers and taxpayers, two important stakeholders in agricultural policies, are
known to be quite inefficient in lobbying due to their "large-group" characteristics.  Thus, attempts
to reform agricultural policies will be resisted by a coalition of the agribusiness and the farm sector.
An analysis of this issue requires the knowledge of whether food firms lobby in agricultural
commodities markets, and if they do, the level of their lobbying expenditures in this market. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a test of whether food firms lobby to influence
agricultural commodity markets and if they benefit from that lobbying activity.  The test is motivated2
by the fact that while food firms may lobby in both their input and output markets, they do not
typically record lobbying expenditures for each market separately. Available data only show the
food firms' total expenditures on their lobbying activities. A test therefore, requires a method for
sorting out the relative allocations of the total lobbying expenditures between the input (agricultural
commodities), and the output (food products) market.  The test focuses on lobbying in the input
market.  Because agricultural commodities constitute such a large share of the food firms' overall
input costs, the test provides evidence about lobbying for agricultural policies.
The results of this inquiry are useful for at least two reasons.  First, if food firms lobbying
allocation to their input market is not significant, indirect evidence that food firms have little interest
in lobbying for or against agricultural commodity programs will be established.  If lobbying by food
firms in their input market is significant, this study will help identify the amount of resources that
food firms devote to lobbying in their input and output markets.  In turn, this information permits
the computation of the relative share of the total lobbying expenditure that goes to influence farm
policy, the impacts of lobbying by food firms on the nature of those policies and on government
transfers to the farm sector.
Interest of Food Firms in Agricultural Policies.
The manufacturing sector has been generally excluded from interest group analysis of
agricultural policy for two related reasons.  1) Consistent with Engel's law, the share of food in total
consumption declines with growth in per capita incomes, diminishing the effect of high food prices3
on the cost of living and thus on the wage bill of the manufacturing sector.  The decreased impact
of food prices on the wage bill acts against manufacturers' involvement in agricultural policy issues.
2) The capital intensity of most businesses and industries increases with development, thus
rendering producers' surplus less sensitive to changes in wages that may result from changes in farm
level commodity prices (Baliscan and Roumasset).  The problem with these arguments is that they
treat the food manufacturing and the rest of the manufacturing sector symmetrically when the use
of farm products, as inputs, is concentrated in food processing firms.
  Connor reports that agricultural commodity inputs constitute an average 32% (48% if one
includes semi-processed ingredients) of the total input cost of food manufacturing firms.  In
addition, the food processing industries are among the largest industries in the manufacturing sector.
Agricultural policies that significantly affect the price and availability of agricultural commodities can
potentially affect the profitability of food processing firms.  Should this happen, food firms would
be expected to react by lobbying against the continuation of agricultural policies harmful to their
interests.  If agricultural policies have no meaningful impact on the profit performance of food firms,
they should not spend any significant amount of resources to lobby in that market.  The motivation
of this study is to develop a method to examine the evidence that might 
support or refute the proposition that food firms lobby for or against agricultural commodity
programs.  
Lobbying by Food Firms in Their Output Market.
Whether food firms lobby in agricultural commodities markets or not, they would be4
expected to lobby against government regulations that adversely affect their production processes
and output markets.  Businesses regularly complain about the regulatory burden, compliance costs,
and unfair competition practices from trading partners. 
A recent survey of food processors with $5 million or more in annual sales listed the
following major concerns with government regulations: (1) Regulations governing operations, (2)
regulations governing safety and labeling which makes the process of product development quite
expensive and (3) regulations governing construction.  In addition, unemployment insurance and
property taxes were deemed too costly by the same food processors.  The study also concluded
that the initial processors of raw agricultural commodities are the most affected by government
regulations.  A chi-square test showed these regulations to significantly affect food processor
operations (Torrok, Schroeder, and Menkhaus).  The study also reported that, because larger
sized food firms had a comparative advantage in complying with government regulations, they were
crowding out smaller firms.  It was estimated that in 1979, approximately 30 percent of clerical
time and $3 billion was spent on complying with government regulations.  Since these regulations
originate from political markets and the cost involved, in terms of time and money, are argued to
be substantial, food manufacturing firms have an interest in lobbying against them.  These
regulations, however, are unrelated to agricultural policies affecting their raw inputs.
Food firms also lobby the government for protection of their products against competing
imports through tariff and nontariff measures.  Lopez and Pagoulatos, for example, observed that
food processing industries in the United States are characterized by relatively low import5
penetration and export propensities.  They also have more restrictive nominal tariff and nontariff
barriers (NTBs) than other manufacturing industries which limits imports from foreign competitors.
To secure these policies, firms spend resources to compete in the political market to influence trade
barriers in their favor.  Lopez and Pagoulatos estimated that the transfers to food processing firms,
due to tariffs, amounted to $8.4 billion in 1972.  Of these, $1.7 billion were for the meat products,
$1.23 billion for dairy products, $1.05 billion for preserved fruits and vegetables, $475.7 million
for grain mill products, $118.7 million for bakery products, $421.8 million for sugar confectionery,
$1.8 billion for fats and oil, $1.08 billion for beverages, $116.6 million for beverages and $1.17
billion for tobacco manufacturers.  These numbers would have been even higher if nontariff
measures had been taken into consideration.  The results indicate that food firms successfully lobby
in their output market.  Generating government revenue could not have been a primary motive since
the government only collected $499.2 million in tax revenue from these tariffs.  Clearly, lobbying
expenditures by food firms may be directed toward government intervention in agricultural
commodities markets, policies and regulations in the output market or both.  Sorting out the
impacts of their lobbying expenditures is the focus of this paper.
Theoretical Framework
Food firms may lobby in both their input and output markets, but they do not typically
record lobbying expenditures for each market separately.  One method to learn the allocations to
various markets may be to design a survey asking food firms to estimate the amount of lobbying
resources they allocate to each activity.  However, survey cost and information confidentiality6
makes this option unattractive.  Alternatively, aggregate lobbying expenditures can be used to
develop systematic estimates of lobbying expenditures in each market.  Formal methodologies for
estimating variable input allocations have been developed only recently.  This research adapts a
profit maximization approach to input allocation developed by Just, et al. 
Following Coggins, et al., and Welliz and Wilson, lobbying is introduced into a profit
maximizing model via a pricing function which determines the prices that economic agents receive
for their output, or pay for their inputs, as a function of lobbying expenditures.  The output (input)
pricing function is assumed increasing (decreasing) and concave (convex) in lobbying expenditures,
that is, there are decreasing returns to lobbying.  In the absence of lobbying, the pricing function
yields the market price.  The pricing function is similar to Becker's influence function (Becker).
However, the pricing function has the advantage of being defined in variables that are directly
observable. This pricing function is also known as the lobbying or tariff formation function in the
trade literature where it has been used to incorporate political markets into trade models.
Suppose a firm is engaged in lobbying in two activities (q, y ).  The firm's objective is to
influence the prices (r, w) of activities ( q, y).  Let noq and noy denote the lobbying expenditures in
activities q and y.  The total observed lobbying expenditure to be allocated among the two activities
is no.  The goal is to estimate noq and noy from the knowledge of no and the behavioral assumption
of profit maximization.  
Assume that the firm chooses the level of output q and lobbying expenditures noq and noy
to solve the following problem:7
Maxq,noy,noqA’r(noq)q&C(w,q) / r(noq)q&C(noy,q)









where r( ) and g( ) are the output and input pricing functions respectively.  These lobbying functions
endogenize the input and output prices.  C( ) is the minimum cost of producing output q.  The
problem includes a lobbying constraint.  The constraint may originate from the restrictions imposed
by the Federal Election Commission on the maximum amount that economic agents can contribute
to the political process.  In addition, if the firm was to spend its entire resources on lobbying, it
would be unable to collect lobbying benefits because access to the latter is tied to ownership of
productive assets.  In this case, the lobbying constraint is internal to the firm.  Assuming an interior
solution, the first order conditions with respect to noq and noy are given by:  
When combined, conditions (2) and (3) show that profit maximization requires marginal returns to
be equalized in the two markets, that is, the firm must exhaust arbitrage opportunities.  The
objective is to use no and the first order conditions of profit  maximization with respect to noq and





































The elasticity with respect to the lobbying in the output and input market is:
Equation (4) implies:
Inserting Equation (5) in the first order conditions one obtains:
Similarly 
where Roq is the revenue of the food firm and C is the cost of producing output q.  The elasticities
eoq and eoy are expected to vary between the two markets, among firms and overtime.  Thus, the
elasticities can be decomposed as follows:
where aq is the output market component, ay is the input market component and bo and dt are the








































Adding (9) and (10) gives:
where 
After the specification of the error structure, equation (11) can be estimated and the parameter
estimates, if significant,  can be inserted into (9) and (10) to find the allocations of the lobbying
inputs between the input and output market.  Note that (11) makes no assumption about the
market structure.  The revenues and costs may have been generated by a competitive firm,
monopolistically competitive firm or any other market structure. 
This approach to modeling expenditure allocation is based on the concept of a stochastic
identity (Hornbaker, Dixon and Sonka).  Consider a population of firms engaged in multiple
lobbying activities. The intensity of lobbying is likely to vary across firms according to the perceived
outcome.  Therefore, the marginal productivities of lobbying have a distribution over a population10
noq ’ (A q%B o%D t) Roq (13)
noy ’ &(A y%B o%D t )C (14)
of firms.  A stochastic identity arises because the productivities of the lobbying input likely vary
across firms within a given industry.
In a stochastic identity, the observed dependent variable (no) is defined as the sum of
products of a random variable which is conceptually fixed.  The stochastic identity in this problem
is represented by equations (9) and (10) where the random variables are n oq and n oy and the
exogenous variables are Roq and C.  Suppose the estimated parameters are denoted as Aq, Ay, Bo
and Dt.  Then, the profit maximizing allocations of the total lobbying expenditure between the input
and output markets can be computed using equations (9) and (10) as follows:  
Not surprisingly, allocations of lobbying resources to each market are proportional to the returns
generated by the two markets.  In addition, the allocations implicitly depend on the relative returns
since the estimating equation is derived from the first order conditions of profit maximization.  An
implicit assumption behind this model is that the lobbying input is a fully allocatable input.  However,
it is more likely that part of the total lobbying budget is non allocatable and benefits both the input
and output markets. Another implicit assumption is that the allocation of the lobbying input takes
the lobbying by other agents in the economy as given. 11
Data Requirements and Sources.
The data needed to estimate equation (11) are (a) costs and (b) revenues for the firms in
the sample and (c) the lobbying expenditures by individual food manufacturing firms. Table I gives
the names of the food companies involved as well their average lobbying expenditures, revenues
and costs. 
Data on costs and revenues for food firms were collected from various issues of the
Moody's Industrial Manual and Standards and Poor's industry surveys between 1984 and 1992.
An important limitation of these data sources is that the information they provide is limited to
publicly traded (owned) food firms.  If the firm is not publicly owned, the above sources do not
provide any kind of financial informationon them.  Thus, the sample of food firms used does not
include privately owned food firms.
Data on lobbying contributions by food firms and agricultural commodity organizations are
published by the Federal Election Commission on financial activities.  The reports give information
on the contribution of various groups to senate and house candidates and by party affiliation. 12
Table I. Food Firms' Average Lobbying Expenditures, Revenues, and Costs.
Food Company Names Lobbying in $ Revenue in $000 Cost in $000
American Home Products 33,695 3,256,771 1,810,709
Anheuser Busch 63,153 7,128,067 4,473,367
Archel Daniel Midland Co. 150,280 4,935,115 4,544,357
Borden 14,200 24,708,455 3,930,629
Brown Forman 62,011 1,165,889 351,346
Castle & Cooke 11,450 1,546,155 1,294,787
Clorox 17,283 1,031,566 505,478
Coca Cola 187,952 7,401,114 3,815,053
Conagra 113,439 5,602,876 4,914,025
Dean Foods Company 7,383 1,100,968 887,383
Flowers Industry Inc 113,750 648,575 343,407
General Mills 95,135 4,355,500 2,482,100
Occidental Petroleum 42,225 16,915,345 13,393,758
Joseph E. Seagram &  Sons, Inc 156,993 2,276,994 1,659,100
Kellog's 107,517 3,050,333 2,317,367
Mckesson Corporation 27,083 5,133,043 4,329,049
Nestle Enterprise Inc Group 42,317 18,043,144 11,258,022
PepsiCo 147,597 8,572,067 16,939,133
Philip Morris/Kraft Genfood 493,653 18,878,333 7,547,000
Quaker Oats 5,075 3,517,333 2,048,633
RJR Nabisco 202,900 11,651,000 6,868,333
Tasty Baking Company 4,833 222,360 151,699
Universal Foods 6,208 529,526 411,804
Wilson Food Corporation 5,228 5,728,433 1,600,922
Source: Averages are computed from data collected from the Election Commission Reports (Lobbying
Expenditures) and from the Moody's Industrial Manuals (Revenues and Costs) over 1983, 1985 and
1987. 13
Data Limitations.
Lobbying data originate from complex election laws governing contributors, recipient and
reporting requirements.  Under U.S. Federal election laws, any American citizen can contribute
funds to a candidate for Federal office or to political parties. However, individuals and owners of
sole proprietorships that have contracts with governments are prohibited from contributing money
to the political process.  Federal election laws impose contribution limits to federal campaign
spending.  "Cash contributions" exceeding a hundred dollars as well as anonymous donations
exceeding fifty dollars are simply prohibited.  In any given year, individuals can contribute by check
or any other traceable instrument a maximum of $25,000.  Disclosure laws require every candidate
for federal office to file reports with the FEC detailing both the income and expenditures of their
campaigns.  In addition, anyone who contributes an aggregate sum of $200 or more, must be
identified by name, address, occupation and employer.  
Federal campaign spending limits are not as restrictive as they appear.  They contain a
major loophole, generally known as soft money which encompasses any contributions not regulated
by federal laws.  Soft money is not subject to any contributions limits but may only be used to
support state and local political activities. However, because of laxity in enforcement, part of the
money ends up supporting federal elections.  For this reason, the reported lobbying data constitutes
the lower bound of political contributions.  
Estimation and Results
Because of the assumption that the elasticities of lobbying with respect to the output price14
noit ’ $rRit % $cCit % ji $i(Rit&Cit)Di%
jt *t(Rit&Cit)Dt%uit
(15)
Null hypothesis H0 : $c ’ 0
Alternative hypothesis Ha : $c not  0 (16)
and cost of inputs for food firms has three additive components, equation (11) is linear in
parameters.  The firm specific and time specific effects are represented by dummy variables that
interact with profit for each firm and time period in the sample. The resulting empirical equation was
estimated:
 Di = 1 for the ith firm and zero otherwise and Dt = 1 for the tth time period (1983-1985) and zero
otherwise.  The total lobbying expenditure of firm i is noit in period t, Rit is the revenue for firm i in
period t, Cit is the cost of the goods sold for firm i in period t and uit a stochastic error term of
unknown heteroskedasticity.  The hypothesis that food firms' lobbying activity in the agricultural
commodity market is not significantly different from zero can be formulated as:
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it can be concluded that food firms do not significantly lobby
in their input market.  
Equation (15) was estimated with SHAZAM econometric software using White's
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity (White).
Table II gives the results without the firm and time specific effects.15
Interpretation of Results.
The results in Table II indicate that the coefficient on the variable COST which represents
the lobbying in the input markets is not statistically different from zero.  This means that food firms
do not significantly lobby in their input markets and by implication do not significantly lobby in
agricultural commodity markets.  The result suggests that the food firms' primary political concerns
are not with farm policy.  For example, the major policy concerns of the Grocery Manufacturers
of America (which represents most major processors and manufacturers of consumer food
products in the United States) relate to the regulation of nutrition, food safety and quality,
advertising policy, packaging and labeling, anti-trust regulations, evaluations of industry
performance, import restrictions and consumer protection policies.  Thus, lobbying resources will
be spent on these issues rather than on lobbying to affect agricultural commodity markets. This
suggestion is supported by the significance of the coefficient on the variable REVENUE which
captures lobbying in the output market.  
Failure to reject the hypothesis that food firms do not lobby in agricultural commodity
markets is consistent with the view that, either food firms have market power in the agricultural
commodity markets that allows them to negotiate lower prices despite government regulations, or
they can pass through any cost increases to consumers, or both.  Whatever the case may be, the
ultimate implication is that the food processing sector of the agribusiness sector has no serious
incentive to act as a countervailing power to the farm lobby in the forming or reforming of
agricultural policy.  This may be one reason why agricultural policy is so hard to change.  There is16
no offsetting lobbying by other interest groups.  Therefore, if farm policy reform requires alternative
lobbying pressures, one cannot hope for serious departures from current farm policies favored by
commodity groups.  The only credible countervailing pressure might be a financing constraint,
originating from a mounting federal budget deficit.  However, the latter affects indirect resource
transfers from the taxpayer to the farm sector.  It is possible to redesign farm policy to effectively
give the producer the power to tax consumers directly through higher prices, as demonstrated by
the sugar program.  For these reasons, attempts to reform farm policy toward a more market
oriented agriculture can reasonably expect serious frustrations.  Even with the dwindling size of the
rural constituency, food and agricultural policies may well be protected by a coalition of rural, urban
and agribusiness interests that will retain transfers to farmers.17
Table II. Food Firms Lobbying Expenditure Allocation          
Equation Estimates: Activities Effect.
            
    
  
VARIABLE    ESTIMATED   STANDARD   T-RATIO    
  NAME      COEFFICIENT      ERROR         45 DF    
                                    
 
REVENUE 0.108E-04 0.548E-05   1.96*
COST 0.142E-05 0.761E-05 0.190
R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =  0.88
 
* indicates significance at 5% level.18
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